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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court's
ruling which granted Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied Deland's Motion for Summary Judgment and Deland's
Motion for a New Trial.

The Supreme Court had original

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann., but
poured it over to this court under Rule 42 Utah R. App. P.

This

court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j), Utah
Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
POINT I
Uintah County agrees with Deland's statement that one of the
issues for review is the interpretation of Section 63-30a-2 Utah
Code Annotated, and whether or not legal fees should be allowed
under that statute when a government employee pleads guilty to
three misdemeanor counts, and three felony counts are dismissed
on motion of the employee, in a multi-count information.
The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law, and is thus reviewed for correctness and
accorded no particular deference.
(Ct. App. 1995).

State v Strader, 902 P.2d 638

See also, State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah
1

1996) .
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).

Higgins v.

An appeal from

a summary judgment is to resolve only legal issues and the
appellate court does not defer to the trial courtfs conclusions
of law but reviews them for correctness.

Perrine v. Kennecott

Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996).

POINT II
The issue of whether Meacham acted during the performance of
his duties, within the scope of his employment or under color of
his authority as required by Section 63-30a-2 when he falsified
his time sheets was not reached by the trial court, but was
raised by Uintah County. (R. 182-186)

This issue only comes into

play if this court decides against Uintah County on Point I.
This court could decide as a matter of law that Meacham1s conduct
fell outside the scope of his employment or if it doesnTt so
decide it should remand the matter to the trial judge for a
factual determination.

Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d

1053 (Utah 1989).
2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
This appeal involves the interpretation of Section 63-30a-2
U.C.A. which states as follows:
Indictment or information against officer or employee Reimbursement of attorneys1 fees and court costs incurred in
defense.
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed
against an officer or employee, in connection with or
arising out of any act or omission of that officer or
employee during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of his employment or under color of his authority, and
that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or
results in a judgment of acquittal, unless the indictment or
information is quashed or dismissed upon application or
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee
shall be entitled to recover from the public entity
reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs necessarily
incurred in the defense of that indictment or information.
Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is set
forth below:
Charged multiple offenses - To be filed in single court.
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints,
citations, or information charging multiple offenses, which
may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense
with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses
charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or
information may not be separated except by order of the
court and for good cause shown.

3

76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined - Joinder of
offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify
the effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of
offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode - Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished
in different ways under different provisions of this code, the
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision
bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under
a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate
trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the
first information or indictment.
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution
for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of
the same criminal episode is barred if;
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that
was or should have been tried under Subsection 761-402(2) in the former prosecution; and

4

(b)

76-8-402.

The former prosecution:
(I)
resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment
for the defendant that has not been reversed,
set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a.
fact that must be established to secure
conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
Misusing public monies.

This section is set forth in its entirety in Addendum 5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Uintah County agrees with Deland's Statement of the Case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Uintah County does not disagree with any of the facts as
stated in the Brief of Appellant (except that the criminal
information was filed November 10, 1993, rather than October 10,
1993) but believes that this court should consider the following
additional facts.
A six count Information was filed against the Uintah CountySheriff on November 10, 1993. (R. 75-77 and Addendum 1)

Three

counts (I, II, and III) alleged felony offenses of making profit
out of or misusing public monies.

5

Three counts (IV, V, and VI)

alleged misdemeanor offenses of falsification or alteration of
government records.
The criminal charges arose from the following factual
situation.

In June, July, and August of 1993, Uintah County and

the United States Forest Service had a contract whereby officers
in the Uintah County Sheriff's Department would provide patrols
on forest service lands on holidays and weekends during the
officers1 off duty hours. (R. 177-178)

The officers were paid by

the Uintah County Treasurer according to a time sheet submitted
by the officer. (R. 177)

The United States Forest Service would

then reimburse the county on an annual basis for all payments
made by the county.

(R. 177)

The basis for the felony and misdemeanor charges stemmed
from false time sheets submitted by Sheriff Meacham, or at his
direction, claiming that he patrolled forest lands on dates when
he did not perform such work, and subsequent payment of public
monies based on the false time sheets. (R. 175)

Three time

sheets were introduced as evidence at the preliminary hearing in
support of all six counts.

(R. 83 and 175)

Each time sheet

formed the basis for a felony count and a misdemeanor count. (R.
175)
The misdemeanor counts were alleged to have occurred June 7,
6

June 21, and July 6, 1993. (R. 75-77)

and stemmed from Meacham

presenting, or causing to be presented, time records requesting
payment for hours worked on the U.S. Forest Service run, which he
knew he had not worked as represented on the forms, intending
that the records be received as genuine.

(R. 65-73 and 175)

The felony counts were alleged to have occurred June 9, June
23, and July 7, 1993. (R. 75-77)

They stemmed from the payments

Meacham received from the Uintah County Treasurer, after having
filed the false claims. (R. 175)
Prior to trial, counsel for Meacham, Loni Deland, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III, the felony counts. (R.
170-174)

Mr. Deland argued in his Memorandum in Support of his

Motion that "In order to be convicted of a criminal violation of
Section 76-8-404 the Defendant must be in a fiduciary capacity,
and due to a conflict of (business) interest, use his position as
a public official/fiduciary in such a way as to make a profit out
of his private business dealings vis-a-vis his public office."
(R. 173)
On April 11, 1994 Mr. Deland's Motion to Dismiss was argued
to Judge Hyde and the three felony counts were dismissed. (R. 81)
Meacham then pled guilty the same day to the three
misdemeanor counts and the State agreed not to file an amended
7

information seeking additional charges against him. (R. 65-73 and
81)
Meacham assigned his claim for legal fees to Deland. (R. 1)
On July 7, 1994 Deland sent his Notice of Claim for
$36,616.50 legal fees incurred in his representation of Meacham
on the felony counts to the Uintah County Attorney. (R. 59-ol)
Uintah County did not formally deny his claim, but refused to pay
it.
The Complaint was filed in the Eighth Judicial District
Court in Uintah County March 6, 1996.

(R. 1-8)

Deland filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on his Second
Cause of Action which sought reimbursement pursuant to Section
63-30a-2 Utah Code Annotated (R. 132-133) and Uintah County filea
a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability.

(R.

137-138)
On August 7, 1996 Judge Anderson granted the county's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

(R. 198-200)

On August 15, 1996 Deland

filed a Motion for a New Trial (R. 243-244), which was denied
September 17, 1996.

(R. 252-253)

Deland's Second and Third

Causes of Action were dismissed by Stipulation of the parties.
(R. 254-257)

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court was correct when it ruled that the
information had to be dismissed in its entirety before the Uintah
County Sheriff was entitled to be reimbursed his legal fees
pursuant to Section 63-30a-2 Utah Code Annotated.

The plain

language of the statute states that the information must be
quashed or dismissed or result in a judgment of acquittal.

The

statute does not contain language such as "dismissed in whole or
in part."

Each of the felonies was a single criminal episode

with one of the misdemeanors, and had to be filed by the state in
a single information.

Even if the state had filed three separate

informations based on the three separate time sheets, none of the
informations would have been dismissed in its entirety.
The legislative history of Section 63-30a-2 Utah Code
Annotated and of its civil equivalent, Sections 63-30-36 and 6330-37 Utah Code Annotated, Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
reflect a legislative intent to narrowly define the situations
when a governmental agency must reimburse an employee for legal
fees incurred in his defense.
Case law suggests that the purpose of Section 63-30a-2 Utah
Code Annotated is to indemnify a "vindicated" employee, which
9

Meacham was not, as he plead guilty to three misdemeanors and was
punished accordingly.

POINT II
This court could rule as a matter of law that Meacham1s
actions in falsifying his time sheets was not within the scope of
his employment.

Such actions violated the Uintah County

Personnel Policy and Procedure and also violated the Law
Enforcement Code of Ethics.

If this court doesn't so find, it

should remand this issue to the trial court for a factual
determination.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION 63-30a-2 U.C.A.
AND REFUSED TO ALLOW LEGAL FEES BECAUSE THE
INFORMATION WAS NOT QUASHED OR DISMISSED OR RESULT IN A
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN ITS ENTIRETY
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 63-30a-2 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
REQUIRES COMPLETE DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION
All statutory references contained herein are to the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, unless otherwise stated.
At issue is the interpretation of Section 63-30a-2

10

which

provides as follows:
"If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed
against an officer or employee, in connection with or
arising out of any act or omission of that officer or
employee during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of his employment or under color of his authority, and
that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or
results in a judgment of acquittal, unless the indictment or
information is quashed or dismissed upon application or
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee
shall be entitled to recover from the public entity
reasonable attorneysTs fees and court costs necessarily
incurred in the defense of that indictment or information."
(emphasis added)
In Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corporation/ 911 P.2d 1290,
1292 (Utah 1996) , our Supreme Court summarized the wellestablished principles involved in statutory interpretation as
follows:
"This Court!s primary responsibility in construing
legislative enactments is to give effect to the
Legislature's underlying intent. West Jordan v. Morrison,
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982)...Generally, the best
indication of that intent is the statute's plain language.
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah
1989). Thus, we will interpret a statute according to its
plain language, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the
express purpose of the statute. West Jordan, 656 P.2d at
446..."
If the meaning of a statute is plain, the "sole function of
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."

State v.

Paul, 560 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993) citing Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction, Section 46.01 (5th Ed. 1992).
11

Each term in a statue should be interpreted according to its
usual and commonly accepted meaning. Paul, supra, at 993 citing
Utah County v. Orem City, 669 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1985).
There is nothing confusing or inoperable about Section 6330a-2.

The plain language of the statute requires that the

information be quashed or dismissed or result in an acquittal
before a public officer is entitled to recover his legal fees
incurred in the defense of that information.

Had the legislature

intended the interpretation urged by opposing counsel, it could
have easily done so by adding language such as "dismissed in
whole or in part" or "result in an acquittal on all or some of
the charges."
Appellant argues that each count in an information should be
treated as a separate information.

Such an interpretation would

conflict with several of our statutes and rules of procedure
dealing with the filing of offenses in informations.
Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that "...informations charging multiple offenses... arising from a
single criminal episode... shall be filed in a single court...and
the offenses within the...information may not be separated except
by order of the court and for good cause shown."
"Single criminal episode" is defined as all conduct which is
12

closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.

Section 76-1-401.

A defendant has the right not to be subject to separate
trials for multiple offenses that are part of a single criminal
episode when these offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court and known to the prosecuting attorney at the time
the defendant is arraigned.

Section 76-1-402.

A subsequent prosecution would be barred if it arose out of
a single criminal episode.
(1)

Section 76-1-403 provides as follows:

If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more

offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of
the same criminal episode is barred if;
(a)

The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that

was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1402(2) in the former prosecution;
Arguably, each of the three separate time sheets submitted
by Meacham and the resulting criminal charges could have been
filed in three separate informations.

However, each false time

sheet formed the basis for a misdemeanor charge of falsifying
government documents (when it was presented) and a felony charge
of misuse of public money (when it was paid a day or two later).
13

(R. 83 and 175)

Each of the felonies was a single criminal

episode with one of the misdemeanors and had to be charged in the
same information.

Counts I and IV of the Information were a

single criminal episode, as were Counts II and V, and Counts III
and VI.

Even though the felony counts were dismissed by Judge

Hyde, the informations would not have been quashed or dismissed
as required by Section 63-30a-2 as Meacham pled guilty to three
misdemeanors.
This court's analysis could stop with the argument set forth
above, as the plain language of the statute is not confused or
ambiguous and requires the information to be dismissed.

However,

a response to opposing counsel1s discussion of the legislative
history may be useful.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 63-30a-2 AND OF SIMILAR
STATUTES, SECTIONS 63-30-36 and 63-30-37, DEMONSTRATE A
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO NARROWLY DEFINE THE SITUATIONS WHEN AN
EMPLOYEE IS REIMBURSED HIS LEGAL FEES
Section 63-30a-2 was enacted in 1977 as Senate Bill 247.
Comments made on the floor of the Senate indicate the legislative
intent was that legal fees were to reimburse an individual who
was found innocent of the charges.

Senator Barlow commented on

the Senate Floor that..."if charges were brought against us for
accepting a bribe, it could be absolutely groundless, but we
14

could be indicted and it could be a very costly legal
expense...to finally prove that we are innocent." (emphasis
added) (R. 154-156 and Addendum 2)

In 1983 House Bill 290 was

passed to include the word "information", with no comments from
the floor.
It is also interesting to note that during the Senate
hearing on March 7, 1977 Senator Jesk inquired of Senator Barlow,
the sponsor of the bill, if there were specific people who would
benefit presently if the bill were to pass.

Senator Barlow

replied that two liquor commissioners who were indicted and
proven innocent would benefit. (R. 154-156 and Addendum 2)
Presumably one of those liquor commissioners was Gerald E.
Hulbert, as it was noted in Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223
(Utah 1980) that Hulbert..."actively lobbied before the
legislature to have the statute enacted." (referring to Section
63-30a-2)

Hulbert was a former Chairman of the Liquor Control

Commission who sued the State to recover his legal fees incurred
in his successful defense of grand jury indictments issued
against him for acts allegedly committed in his official capacity
and pursuant to the then recently enacted Section 63-30a-2.

In

1975, a state grand jury, over a period of several months, issued
twelve indictments against him.

The law firm he retained,
15

represented him over a two and one-half year period, made sixtyfive court appearances, conducted two trials, and made two
appeals.

The court in Hulbert noted that "The result of this

vigorous defense was the exoneration of plaintiff on all twelve
indictments."

The court also held that the benefits of Section

63-30a-2 were to be applied retroactively.
In 1977 at the time the legislature was considering Senate
Bill 247 and Mr. Hulbert was lobbying for its passage, Mr.
Hulbertfs situation was much different that Mr. Meacham 1 s.

Mr.

Hulbert was completely exonerated on all twelve counts after long
and costly litigation; Mr. Meacham pled guilty to three
misdemeanor counts and the three felonies were dismissed because
the district court's interpretation of the felony statute, not
because of a finding of innocent behavior by Mr. Meacham.
Sections 60-30-36 and 63-30-37 (Governmental Immunity Act)
are similar to Section 63-30a-2 in that they provide that a
governmental entity

defend an employee, or reimburse the

employee for legal fees incurred by the employee in his defense,
in civil actions brought against the employee for actions taken
by the employee during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority.

The

governmental entity also is required to pay any judgment entered
16

against the employee or settlement of the claim.

In 1987

Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37 were amended by House Bill No. 15.
(R. 98-100 and Addendum 3)

The changes reflect a legislative

intent to tighten the circumstances under which the government
agency must defend or pay for judgments entered against its
employees in civil suits.

(R. 94-97 and Addendum 4)

Language

was added to Section 60-30-36 and 60-30-37 which allowed a
governmental entity to decline to defend an employee or pay for
any judgment if the entity determines that the act in question
did not occur during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of his employment, or under color of authority;
or that the injury resulted from fraud or malice of the employee;
or that the injury resulted from the employee being under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.
Reference Bulletin.

See Interim Study Committee

(R. 94-97 and Addendum 4 ) .

It would be unfair to allow Meacham reimbursement of his
defense fees when he pled guilty to criminal acts involving
fraud, when another county employee sued civilly because of
fraudulent conduct, would not be allowed a defense at government
expense.

The legislative changes in 1987 further limiting the

situations when a governmental entity is required to defend an
employee, support the narrow interpretation the trial judge made
17

of Section 63-30a-2 as requiring a complete acquittal of all
charges before an employee is entitled to be reimbursed his legal
fees.
C.
ONLY A "VINDICATED" EMPLOYEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED HIS LEGAL
FEES
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996) provides us
with the Utah Supreme Courtfs opinion as to the purpose of
Section 63-30a-2 U.C.A.

In Salmon, a Deputy Sheriff was charged

with two Class B Misdemeanors of assault that arose out of
actions taken by him in the course of his employment.

Separate

trials were held on each count and two separate juries found him
not guilty.

The issue in Salmon was the amount the deputy

sheriff should be reimbursed for legal fees, as the County
stipulated that he was entitled to reimbursement.

Justice

Zimmerman, in concurring that Salmon should be entitled to
attorney1s fees incurred in litigating his right to attorney's
fees, wrote that "I agree that lack of such an award would
undermine the purpose of Section 63-30a-2, which is to indemnify
a vindicated employee."

(emphasis added)

"Vindicate" is defined as, "to clear of accusation, censure,
suspicion, etc."
1992).

WebsterT s Dictionary, (Pamco Publishing Comp.

Meacham was not vindicated of the criminal charges
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because the information was not dismissed in its entirety.

Based

on his guilty plea to three Class B Misdemeanors, he was
sentenced to serve thirty days jail which was suspended; was
placed on court probation for one year; and was ordered to pay a
fine of $1,387.50 and restitution of $450.00.

(R. 68-74 and 81)

POINT II
WHEN HE FALSIFIED HIS TIME SHEETS MEACHAM DID NOT ACT DURING THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
OR UNDER COLOR OF HIS AUTHORITY
The issue of whether or not Meacham acted during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or
under color of his authority was raised by Uintah County in its
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 182-186 Memorandum in Opposition
to PlaintiffTs Motion for Summary Judgment... and In Support of
Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment) but was never
reached by the trial court.

(R. 198-200)

This issue is

generally a factual question to be determined by the trier of
fact, unless it is so clearly outside the scope of employment
that this court can decide it as a matter of law.
Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).

Birkner v.

This court need

only deal with the issue if it decides against Uintah County on
Point I discussed above.

If this court does not rule that
19

MeachairTs conduct in falsifying time sheets, as a matter of law,
was outside his scope of employment, then it should remand the
matter to the trial court for a factual determination.
Meacham was originally charged with three felony counts in
violation of Section 76-8-402 - misusing public monies.

The

information followed the language of the charging statute and
alleged that "...Meacham, while Sheriff of Uintah County, a
public officer, knowingly... committed the crimes of misuse of
public money."
This statute however, can be distinguished from Section 6330a-2, under which Meacham now seeks reimbursement.

In Section

76-8-402 the focus is on the public monies and imposes criminal
sanctions for any public officer who misappropriates the public
monies for his own use.

Persons other than public officers, if

they receive, safekeep, or disburse public monies and fail to
deal with the monies lawfully, are also guilty of a third degree
felony. (Section 76-8-403)

There is no language or requirement

that the public officer act during the performance of his duties,
or within the scope of his employment, or under color of his
authority when he appropriates the public monies for his own use.
In fact, for the reasons stated below, such acts would not be
considered within the scope of his employment.
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Section 63-30a-2

on the other hand, specifically requires that attorney's fees are
only reimbursable if the information or indictment is "filed in
connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that
officer or employee during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of his employment or under color of his authority and
the information or indictment is dismissed or results in a
judgment of acquittal."

Thus, under Section 76-8-402, one need

only be a public officer who misappropriates public money or
under Section 76-8-403 any person who receives, safekeeps, or
disburses public monies unlawfully to be guilty of the crimes,
whereas, before being entitled to be reimbursed legal fees, a
public officer must have acted during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color of his
authority.
In Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) it
was held that a therapist employed by the County Mental Health
Facility who engaged in sexual misconduct with a patient, was not
entitled to indemnification by the County because the act did not
occur during the performance of his duties or within the scope of
his employment, as required by the statute in effect at the time.
In determining scope of employment, the court in Birkner
discussed three criteria that Utah cases have tended to focus on:
21

(1) The employee's conduct must be of the general kind the
employee is employed to perform. The employee must be about
the employer's business and the duties assigned by the
employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a personal
endeavor.
(2) The employee's conduct must occur within the hours of
the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of
the employment.
(3) The employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in
part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest.
In Birkner the court held, as a matter of law, that the
sexual misconduct was outside the scope of employment.
Meacham's actions should be analyzed using the Birkner
criteria:
(1) The employee's conduct must be of the general kind the
employee is employed to perform. The employee must be about the
employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer, as
opposed to being wholly involved in a personal endeavor.
Although Meacham was performing the duties of a peace
officer when he patrolled the forest service land, he did so for
his own benefit and was ultimately reimbursed for the hours he
performed by the U.S. Forest Service.

This not a situation where

Meacham used excessive force or arrested someone maliciously
while acting as a peace officer of Uintah County although being
paid by the Forest Service.

In such a situation, the Court may

well find that his actions were within the scope of his
employment or under color of authority as a Uintah County
22

employee even though he was earning extra money working for the
Forest Service.
(2) The employee's conduct must occur within the hours of
the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the
employment.
Meacham was to perform the services for the forest Service
on the weekends and holidays when he was not performing his
regular duties as Sheriff of Uintah County.

(R. 177-178) He was

to patrol Forest Service land.
(3) The employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in
part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest.
Meacham's actions in falsify his time sheets, in no way
benefited Uintah County and was contrary to the County Policy
(see Uintah County Personnel Policies and Procedures Sections
610, which provides that an employee who violates a criminal law
is subject to discipline, including dismissal.

(R. 150-153)

His

actions were also contrary to the standards set for peace
officers, who are sworn to uphold the laws.
Enforcement Code of Ethics:
law..."

(P. 149)

haw

"I will be exemplary in obeying the

In analyzing the employee's actions and finding them not

within the scope of employment, the Court in Birkner found it
relevant that the employee's actions violated the employee's
professional duties and violated the rules of the Utah Department
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of Business Regulation that prohibited a social worker from
engaging in sexual activities with clients.
J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992)
also dealt with the issue of whether a police officer who was
employed to instruct Explorer Scouts in the area of police work,
acted within the scope of his employment when he molested a
scout.

The court held that the officer's acts were "a complete

abandonment of...his employment."

Further, such conduct was not

motivated in any way to benefit the officer's employer.
Meacham ! s conduct in falsifying time sheets that gave rise
to the criminal charges was not the type of conduct he was to
perform as the Uintah County Sheriff.

Such conduct was a

personal endeavor and not motivated to serve Uintah County's
interest.

CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the District Court's ruling that
granted Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied
Deland's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for a New Trial.
Only if this court denies this relief does it need to reach the
issue of scope of employment.

It should rule as a matter of law

that Meacham's conduct was outside the scope of his employment,
24

or if this court does not make that determination, it should
remand this issue to the District Court for it to make a factual
determination of scope of employment.
DATED this the^QH^

day of March, 1997.

GAA^

D

ANN B. STRlNGHflB
Uintah County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Herschell
Bullen, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, Stock and Mining
Exchange Bldg., 39 Exchange Place, Second Floor, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111.
DATED this the Jty)<!&^ day of March, 1997.

/TfriuA. (h. Xf^l
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ADDENDUI

AFFIDAVIT
I, Greg Burdett, do solemnly swear that on July 26, 1996,1
listened to the record of the Senate debate, which occurred on
March 7, 1077, tot Senate

IMII

?A '', and I iMvue iiie attached

transcription while listening to that record. Moreover; the attached
transcript of the Senate's debate for Seriate Bill ,:4 / is an accurate
transcription of that debate which occurred on March 7, 1977.
DATED this 26th day of July, 1996.

Zl
Greg Bu^dt

State of Utah
County of Utah

)
) ss.
)

The foregoing affidavit was acknowledged before me this
26th d ^ p f July, 1996, by Greg Burdett.
(i

*£S25N SANDRA W. DIXON
t/£^i%
MUM PU8UC- STATE of UTAH
! * ( * § £ £ ]'*\ CEN™RY TilTlE COMPANY
A w § 5 > # / 2 9 G EAST 930 SOUTH
' v V l : . , ' V OREM, UTAH 84058
"---—'''
COMM. EXP. 2-11-CG

Senate Bill 24 7, Reii nbi irsemei it of OfFicei s ai id Ei nplo> ees, sponsored by Senators Bowen and
Barlow
This bill provides for the leimbursement to officers and employees of the state for
legal fees and costs necessarily incur red in the successfiil defense of grand jury
indictments.
March?, 1977, Senate Floor.
Senator Barlow:

Mr. President, Senate Bill 247 relates to the providing for the
reimbursement to officers and employees for legal fees and costs
incurred in the special defense of a grand jury indictment. Of
course, what this means is if they are found innocent and in
defending themselves against charges which were not proven, it
would simply reimburse them for reasonable attorney fees, for these
charges, or for the indictment. And, I just think this could really
happen to any one of us, after all we are consider officers of the
state as legislators, if charges were brought against us for accepting
a bribe, it could be absolutely groundless, but we could be indicted
and it could be a very costly legal expense, unless we happen to be
an attorney ourselves, even then your time is valuable, but for most
of us it would be a very costly legal expense to finally prove that we
are innocent. I think that it is absolute right and proper, so I hope
you will support us in this bill.

Senator J esk:

Would Senator Barlow yield to a question17

Senator Barlow:

Yes. I'll try to.

Senator J esk:

Are there specific people who would benefit presently if this bill
would pass and if so would you name them?

Senator Barlow:

Yes,, I would think the two commissioners who were involved in
the — the liquor commissioners who were indicted and proven
innocent, they would be beneficiaries of this bill. There might be
some others, but they are the only two I'm aware of.

Unknown Senator:

Senator Barlow, my I ask a question Mr. President? Now in
answer to Senator Jesk's question, I what was the answer again.

Senator Barlow:

The answer was .
mentioned them.

I

1

Unknown Senator:

And that is what! -:i r

• - -,

•

. ••£/

Senator Barlow:

Yes, that is correct.

Senate President:

Thei e is a qi i : i i n i i presei it Do 11 leai a sii igle dissenting \ otel '

Unknown Senator:

No.

Senate President:

I hear one, we will have a roll call vote on Senate bill 247,

Roll Call Vote Conducted.
Senate President:

Senate bill 247 has received twenty four (24) aye votes, four (4) no
votes, and one (1) not being present has been passed by the Senate
and will be sent to the House for further action.
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5$.
(7) Any federal or state aeenc). board, or commission, ^peaaj district, or municipal corporation
that makes ^ survey o\ lands within this sjate_shal_l
comply with this section.
Section 9. Section Enacted.
Section P-23-1S. Utah Code Annotated 1953,
is enacted to read:
17-23-18. Survey maps and narratives
Amendments.
(1) Any survey map or narrative_ filed and recorded under the provisions o( this chapter may be
amended by an affidavit of corrections:
[*) to show any courses or distances omitted from
the map or narrative;
(b) to correct an error in the description of the
real property shown on the map or narrative: or
(c) to correct _any other errors or omissions where
the error or omission is ascertainable from the data
shown on the map or narrative as recorded.
(2) (a) The affidavit of correction shall be prepared by the registered professional land surveyor
who filed the map or narrative.
(b) In the event of the death, disability, or retirement from practice of the surveyor who filed the
map or narrative, the county surveyor may prepare
the affidavit of correction.
(c) The affidavit shall set forth in detail the corrections made.
(d) The seal and signature of the registered professional land surveyor filing the affidavit of correction shall be affixed to the affidavit.
(3) The county surveyor having jurisdiction of the
map or narrative shall cenify that the affidavit of
correction has been examined and that the changes
shown on the m a p or narrative are changes permitted under this section.
(4) Nothing in this section permits changes in
courses or distances for the purpose of redesigning
parcel configurations.
Section 10. Sections Repealed.
Section 17-23-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1961,
Section 17-23-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1961,
Section 17-23-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah 1979,
and Section 17-23-11, Utah Code A n n o t a t e d
1953, are repealed.

C! 1APTER 30
H. B. No. 15
Passed January 30. ^ '
Approved March 10. x >'
Effective July I. W>'
CLARIFICA 1 ION OK PI HI V :
E M P L O Y E E S I N D E M N U K ' VMON
};:• i "nl B. Wilson
AN v I KrI.Aii.NG TO SI Vlt KKKA1RS IN
G E M R A i . CLARIFYING CIK\ I MSTANCES
IN WHICH A GOVERNMKNVVl ENTITY
MUST REPRESENT, OR MA\ REFUSE TO
REPRESENT, A PUBLH
EMPLOYEE
AGAINST A CIVIL CLAIM. CLARIFYING
PAYMENT OF FEES AND COSYS INCURRED
BY EMPLOYEE IN DEFENSF OK CRIMINAL
CHARGE; AND PROVIDING VN EFFECTIVE
DATE.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTION OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS RX IOWS:
AMENDS:
63-30-36, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 131,
LAWS OF UTAH 1983
63-30-37, AS ENACTED BY ^ HAPTER 131,
LAWS OF UTAH 1983
63-30A-3, AS LAST AMENDE: Sx. < \ IA PTER
194, LAWS OF UTAH 1986
Be it enacted by the Legislature i\*' *^ ^ : " °t Vtah:
Section. 1. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-36, Utah Code vt=outed 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 131, Laws - ' ^ ^ ^ 8 3 , is
amended to read:
63-30-36. Defending government <***>>** *
Request - Cooperation - Pay m e * * judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Sub^ccvca P and (3),
a governmental entity shall ck**^. An>" a c l i ° n
brought against its employee a n ^ \ c s an act or
omission occurring:
(a) during the performance ^ * employee's
duties;
(b) within the scope of the c - v ^ e e / > employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
[WJ (2) (a) Before a g o v e r r . ^ - i entity may
defend its employee against a c&-~- -*-" employee
[must] shall make a written r e c * ^ -x "•"* governmental entity to defend him [aft^-PH*-*****""];
(i) within ten days after ser\ ici : ::A:*SS upon
him; or

T>d
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(ii) within [such] a longer period [as] t_hau would
not prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining
a defense on his behalf[,]; or
(iii) within a period that^ would not conflict with
notice requirements imposed on the entity in connection with insurance carried by the entity relating
to the risk involved.
(_b) If the employee fails to make a request, or
fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the
governmental entity [«] need not [required to]
defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay
any judgment, compromise, or settlement against
the employee in respect to the claim.
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend
an action against an employee if it determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not
occur:
(i) during the performance of the employee's
duties; or
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or

Ch. 30

tfffiftg-diifmt-^he-^effofffl^fK^e^-his duties, within
the--5^ope—of-his- ^mpk>yfflem,--or under-color of
autbofHyj if the conditions set forth in Subsection (3)
are established.
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-301L a_fft-Pii the__qbljgation qf_a governmental entity to
provide insurance coverage according to the~requTrements of Subsection 41-12a-301 (3) and Section
63-30-29.5.
(b) A governmental entity may refuse to defend
an action against its employee under the conditions
set forth in Subsection (3), but shall still provide
coverage up to the amount specified in Sections 31 A22-304 and 63-30-29.5.
Section 2. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 131, Laws of Utah 1983, is
amended to read:
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense
costs by government employee.

(iii) under color of authority; or

(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays
a judgment entered against him, or any portion of
it, which the governmental entity is required to pay
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim L under Section 63-30-36, the employee [is entitled
to] may recover from the governmental entity the
was based resulted from:
amount of [s&eb] the payment and the reasonable
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in
costs incurred in his defense [from the governme
actual physical control of a vehicle:
ntal entity].
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the
greater by weight than the established legal limit; or
defense of an employee against a claim, or [dees
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any
conduct] conducts the defense under an agreement as
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable
provided in Subsection 63-30-36 (f3)] (6), the
of safely driving the vehicle; or
employee may recover from the governmental entity
under Subsection (1) if:
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that rendered the person
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omisincapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
sion upon which the judgment is based occurred
during the performance of his duties, within the
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally
scope of his employment, or under color of authoimpaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform
rity, and that he conducted the defense in good
his job function because of the use of alcohol,
faith; and
because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled
substance as defined in Section 58-37-4, or
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that
because of the combined influence of alcohol and a
the injury or damage resulted fronK
nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee;
Section 58-37-4.
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written
actual physical control of a vehicle:
request to defend an employee, the governmental
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or
entity shall inform the employee whether or not it
greater by weight than the established legal limit;
shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide
a defense, the basis for its refusal.
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense
of safely driving the vehicle;
shall not be admissible for any purpose in the action
in which the employee is a defendant.
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that rendered the person
[(2)] (5) If a governmental entity conducts the
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
defense of an employee, the governmental entity
shall pay any judgment based upon the claim, or
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally
any compromise or settlement of the claim, except
impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform
as provided in Subsection [(3)] (6).
his job function because of the use of alcohol,
because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled
[f3)] (6) A governmental entity may conduct the
substance as defined in Section 58-37-4, or
defense of an employee under an agreement with the
because of the combined use of alcohol and a nonemployee that the [government] governmental entity
prescribed controlled substance as defined in Section
reserves the right not to pay [the] a judgment,
58-37-4.
that the claim arose out of an act or omission occ(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the
fraud or malice of the employee; or
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Section 3. Section Amended.

Section 1. Section Amended.

Section 63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter 194, Laws of Utah
1986, is amended to read:

Section 41-1-44.1. Utah Code Annotated 1953.
as last amended b> Chapter 30, Laws of Utah 1985,
is amended to read:

63-30a-3. Request for defense or reimbursement.

41-1-44.1. Plates issued to political subdivisions
or state - When letters "E\" are to be displayed
- Exceptions.

(JJ A request [fef~a-<iefeflse of a criminal charge
ef-4ftdictmem tt4] for reimbursement of attorneys'
fees and court costs shall be filed in the manner
provided in Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37.
(2) (a) Any reimbursement of attorneys' fees and
court costs filed on behalf of an officer or employee
of the state shall be paid from funds appropriated
to the department or division that employed the
officer or employee at the time of the act or omission that gave rise to the indictment or information.
(b) If those funds are unavailable, the reimbursement shall be paid from the General Fund upon
approval by the Board of Examiners and legislative
appropriation.
Section 4. Effective Date.
This act takes effect on July 1, 1987.

LICENSE PLATES OF LEASED STATE
VEHICLES
By Stephen^!. Bodily
AN ACT RELATING TO IDENTIFICATION OF
GOVERNMENT VEHICLES; REQUIRING
THAT GOVERNMENT VEHICLES BE IDENTIFIED WITH AN IDENTIFICATION MARK
AND AN "EX' PLATE; MAKING EXCEPTIONS TO THE IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT; AND MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:
41-1-44.1, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
30, LAWS OF UTAH 1985
CHAPTER

70,

REPEALS:
41-7-1, AS LAST AMENDED
32, LAWS OF UTAH 1983

BY CHAPTER

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

326

(b) display an identification mark designating the
vehicle as the property of the entity in a conspicuous
place on both sides of the vehicle.

(a) the motor vehicle is in the direct service of the
governor or lieutenant governor of Utah or the attorney general, state auditor, or state treasurer of
Utah;
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Effective April 27, 1987

BY

(a) place a registration plate displaying [have
displayed upon it] the letters, "EX[7]" [except as
provided in Subsections (2) and (3).] on every vehicle
owned and operated by them or leased for their
exclusive use; and

(2) The [provisions contained in this section do
not include motor vehicles in the service of the
governor of the state, the attorney general, or any
federal, state, or local governmental departments
engaged in investigative work where secrecy is necessary] entity need not display the *EX" registration
plate or the identification mark required by Subsection (1) if:

CHAPTER 31
H. B. No. 18

41-7-1.5, AS ENACTED
LAWS OF UTAH 1963

(1) Every [regi^fajien-plate issued to-aftyj town,
city, board of education, [ef-efhef] school district,
state [institutions! institution of learning, county",
[of] other governmental department, [in the state;
ef-fe] subdivision, or district, and the state [itself

(b) the motor vehicle is used in official investigative work where secrecy is essential;
(c) the motor vehicle is provided to an official of
the entity as part of a compensation package allowing unlimited personal use of that vehicle; or
(d) the personal security of the occupants of the
vehicle would be jeopardized if the "EX" registration plate were in place.
(3) Plates issued to Utah Highway Patrol vehicles
may bear the capital letters "UHP," a beehive logo,
and the call number of the vehicle for which the
plate is issued.
(4) The State Tax Commission [is responsible for
the issuance of] shall issue "EX" and "UHP" plates,
and shall [promulgate necessary] enact rules [te
carry out this duty] establishing the procedure for
application and distribution for the plates.
Section 2. Section Amended.
Section 41-7-1.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 70, Laws of Utah 1963, is
amended to read:
41-7-1.5. Marking of state-owned vehicles for
departments, colleges and universities - Duties of
department of finance - Exceptions.
(1) (a) Ail [state owned and—operated] motor
vehicles owned, leased for use, or operated by the
state shall [be marked as provided in this section]
display an identification mark and "EX" plates as
required by Section 41-1-44.1.
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Date
H. B. NO. 15

Title

October 9, 1986

SESSION.

CLARIFICATION OF PUBLIC EMPI,OYE$S INDEMNIFICATION
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Joint Rule 23.16 requires the Legislative General Counsel or his designee to review and approve all legislation and,
with the approval of the sponsor, to make those changes necessary to: (a) insure that it is in proper legal formi (b)
remove any ambiguities; and (c) avoid constitutional or statutory conflicts.
The Legislative General Counsel or his designee has reviewed and approved this legislation. The following
information outlines the considerations on whicl* the approval was given.
.'•'...:

-tf
•
yes no

1. The bill contains a "single subject" which is clearly expressed In the
title as required by the Utah Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 22.

an

2. The bill meets all the form requirements prescribed by legislative rule.

yes

no

•

no
conflicts

3. The bill does not have state or federal constitutional conflicts.
(Judgments regarding constitutionality address only obvious constitutional
problems and do not represent a detailed review of all issues.}
Explanation

possible
conflicts
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Interim Study Committee R
eference Bulletin Report
for the 1987 General Sess
ion

Interim Study Committee
Reference Bulletin
Report for the 1987 General Session

This bulletin provides a brief summary of studies and recommendations
requiring action at the 1987 General Session.
Included in each study report are the following:
• A summary of background information.
• A statement of committee action.
• A summary of proposed legislation.
• A list of available reference sources.

Reference Bulletin Number 8, January 1987
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TORT REFORM/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
I.

Background Information

In the past several years, lawsuits naming governmental entities as defendants
have increased dramatically. The large damage awards against governmental entities
that plaintiffs have obtained in these lawsuits has made it increasingly difficult for
government entities to obtain or afford liability insurance.
A task force coordinated by the League of Cities and Towns proposed three bills
that would make it more difficult to obtain a damage award against a government
entity.
I.

Committee Action

At its September and October meetings, the committee heard from
reviewed draft legislation from the Governmental Immunity Task Force.

and

The committee made the following recommendations:

III.

a.

Antitrust Amendments - The committee recommended a proposal to
prohibit recovery of damages, attorney's fees, or costs against a political
subdivision or its representatives, or from anyone who acted at the
direction of the representatives of a political subdivision.

b.

Clarification of Public Employees Indemnification - The committee
recommended a proposal to allow the government entity to refuse to pay
an employee's legal fees if the employee was acting without authority,
outside his job responsibilities, or if the employee intentionally lied or
cheated in performing the act. The committee also recommended that the
government entity be allowed to refuse to defend an employee who caused
someone harm because the employee was under the influence of alcohol or
drugs.

c.

Governmental Immunity Act Amendments - The committee agreed to the
recommendation that the Legislature define everything performed by
government as a "governmental function." As so defined, a government
entity could be sued only for those acts which the Legislature had
specifically allowed them to be sued for.

Proposed Legislation

The interim committee has endorsed the following legislation for the 1987
General Session:
House Bill 17, "Amendments to Utah Antitrust Act," limits a plaintiffs ability
to recover damages or fees when filing a complaint against a government entity.

<*<
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House Bill 15, "Clarification of Public Employees Indemnification," outlines
public employees1 activities that may cause forfeiture of their rights for government
defense.
House Bill 16, "Governmental Immunity Act
"governmental function," and "discretionary function"
Governmental Immunity Act.
IV.

Amendments,"
for purposes

defines
of the

Reference Sources

Fellows, John L., Governmental Immunity
Office of Legislative Research and
1986.
State and Local Affairs Interim Committee.
20 and September 17, 1986.

Memorandum.
Salt Lake City:
General Counsel, September 4,
Minutes of meetings of August

For additional information in this area, contact Dotti A. Mortensen, Research
Analyst, or John L. Fellows, Associate General Counsel, Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel.
* * *
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OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT

(n) medicine other than medicine provided by the facility's health care providers in
compliance with facility policy, cr
(in) poison in any quantit)
id) Any person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor who without the permission of the authority operating the correctional or mental
health facility fails to declare or knowingly possesses at a correctional facility or in a secure area
of a mental health facility any
(1) spirituous or fermented liquor,
(n) medicine, or
(in) poison in any quantity
(6) The possession distribution or use of a controlled substance at a correctional facility or in a
secure area of a mental health facility shall be prosecuted in accordance with Title 58 Chapter 37, U t a h
Controlled Substances Act
1996
76-8-312. B a i l - j u m p i n g .
(1) A person is guilty of an offense when having
been released on bail or on his own recognizance by
court order or by other lawful authority upon condition that he subseauently appear personally upon a
charge of an offense he fails without j u s t cause to
appear at the time and place which have been lawfully
designated for his appearance
(2) An offense under this section is a felony of the
third degree when the offense charged is a felony, a
class B misdemeanor when the offense charged is a
misdemeanor and an infraction when the offense
charged is an infraction
1974
76-8-313. Threatening elected officials — Commission of assault.
A person commits assault on an elected official
when he attempts or threatens, irrespective of a
showing of immediate force or violence, to inflict
bodily injury to the elected official with the intent to
impede, intimidate, or interfere with the elected official in the performance of his official duties or with the
intent to retaliate against the elected official because
of the performance of his official duties
1996
76-8-314. Threatening elected
officials
—
"Elected official* defined.
As used in this section, "elected official" means
(1) any elected official of the state, county, or
city and includes the members of t h e official's
immediate family
(2) any temporary judge appointed to fill a
vacant judicial position,
(3) any judge not yet retained by a retention
election,
(4) any member of a school board, and
(5) any person appointed to fill a vacant position of an elected official as defined in Subsection
(1)

1996

76-8-315. Threatening elected officials — Penalties for assault.
Assault on an elected official is a felony of the third
degree if bodily injury is attempted or occurs, otherwise the assault is a class B misdemeanor
1983
76-8-316. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating
against a judge or member of t h e
Board of Pardons and Parole.
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the
person threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder a
judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere
with the judge or member of the board while engaged
m the performance of the judge's or member's official

76-8-402

duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge
or member on account of the performance of those
official duties
(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the
person commits an assault on a judge or a member of
the Board of Pardons and Parole with the intent to
impede intimidate or interfere with the judge or
member of the board while engaged m the performance of the judge's or member's official duties, or
with the intent to retaliate against the judge or
member on account of the performance of those official
duties
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the
person commits aggravated assault or attempted
murder on a judge or a member of the Board of
Pardons and Parole with the purpose to impede,
intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of
the board while engaged in the performance of the
judge s or member's official duties or with the purpose
to retaliate against the judge or member on account of
the performance of those official duties
(4) As used in this section
(a) "Immediate family" means parents, spouse,
surviving spouse, children, and siblings of the
officer
(b) "Judge" means judges of all courts of record
and courts not of record
(c) "Judge or member" includes the members of
the judge's or member's immediate family
(d) "Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole" means appointed members of the board
(5) A member of the Board of Pardons and Parole is
an executive officer for purposes of Subsections 76-520200

1995
PART 4

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PROPERTY
76-8-401. "Public monies" and "public officer*
defined.
As used m this title
(1) "Public monies" means "public funds" as
defined m Section 51-7-3
(2) "Public officer" means
(a) all elected officials of the state, a political subdivision of the state, a county, town,
city, precinct, or district,
(b) a person appointed to or serving an
unexpired term of an elected office,
(c) a judge of a court of record a n d not of
record including justice court judges, and
(d) a member of the Board of Pardons and
Parole
1995
76-8-402. M i s u s i n g p u b l i c m o n i e s .
(1) Every officer of this state or a political subdivision, or of any county, city, town, precinct, or district of
this state, and every other person charged with the
receipt, safekeepmg, transfer or disbursement of public monies commits an offense if the officer or other
charged person
(a) appropriates the money or any portion of it
to his own use or to the use of another without
authority of law,
(b) loans the money or any portion of it without
a u t h o n t y of law,
(c) fails to keep the money m his possession
until disbursed or paid out by authonty of law,
(d) unlawfully deposits the money or any portion in any bank or with any other person,
(e) knowingly keeps any false account or
makes any false entry or erasure m any account
of or relating to the money,

76-8-403

CRIMINAL AND TRAFFIC CODE

(f) fraudulently alters, falsifies, conceals, destroys, or obliterates any such account;
(g) willfully refuses or omits to pay over, on
demand, any public monies in his hands, upon the
presentation of a draft, order, or warrant drawn
upon such monies by competent authority;
(h) willfully omits to transfer the money when
the transfer is required by law; or
(i) willfully omits or refuses to pay over, to any
officer or person authorized by law to receive it,
any money received by him under any duty imposed by law so to pay over the same.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) is a felony of the
third degree, except it is a felony of the second degree
if:
(a) the value of the money exceeds $5,000;
(b) the amount of the false account exceeds
$5,000;
(c) the amount falsely entered exceeds $5,000;
(d) the amount that is the difference between
the original amount and the fraudulently altered
amount exceeds $5,000; or
(e) the amount falsely erased, fraudulently
concealed, destroyed, obliterated, or falsified in
the account exceeds $5,000.
1995
76-8-403.

Failure to k e e p a n d p a y o v e r p u b l i c
monies.
Every person who receives, safekeeps, transfers, or
disburses public monies who neglects or fails to keep
and pay over the money in the manner prescribed by
law is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
1995
76-8-404.

Making profit o u t of o r m i s u s i n g public m o n i e s — Disqualification from office.
A public officer, regardless of whether or not the
officer receives, safekeeps, transfers, disburses, or h a s
a fiduciary relationship with public monies, who shall
make a profit out of public monies, or shall use t h e
same for a purpose not authorized by law, is guilty of
a felony as provided in Section 76-8-402 and shall, in
addition to the punishment provided by law, be disqualified to hold public office.
1995

any tax or license of any kind, or who receives payment for the tax or license without delivering the
receipt prescribed by law, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1973
76-8-409.

R e f u s i n g to g i v e t a x a s s e s s o r or t a x or
license collector list of, or denying
access to, employees.
Every person who, when requested by the assessor
or collector of taxes or license fees, refuses to give to
the assessor or collector the name and residence of
each person in his employ, or to give the assessor or
collector access to the building or place of employment, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1991
76-8-410. D o i n g b u s i n e s s without l i c e n s e .
Every person who commences or carries on any
business, trade, profession, or calling, for t h e transaction or carrying on of which a license is required by
any law, or by any county, city, or town ordinance,
without taking out the license required by law or
ordinance is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1973
76-8-411. Trafficking in warrants.
No state, county, city, town, or district officer shall,
either directly or indirectly, contract for or purchase
any warrant or order issued by the state, county, city,
town, or district of which he is an officer, at any
discount whatever upon the s u m due on the warrant
or order, and, if any state, county, city, town, or district
officer shall so contract for or purchase any such order
or warrant on a discount, he is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
1973
76-8-412.

Stealing, d e s t r o y i n g or mutilating
public records by custodian.
Every officer having the custody of any record, map,
or book, or of any paper or proceedings of any court,
filed or deposited in any public office, or placed in his
hands for any purpose, who is guilty of stealing,
willfully destroying, mutilating, defacing, altering,
falsifying, removing, or secreting the whole or any
part thereof, or who permits any other person so to do,
is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
1973

76-8-405.

Failure t o p a y o v e r fine, forfeiture or
fee.
Every public officer who receives any fine, forfeiture, or fee and refuses or neglects to pay it over
within the time prescribed by law is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
1973

76-8-413.

76-8-406. Obstructing collection of r e v e n u e .
Every person who willfully obstructs or hinders any
public officer from collecting any revenue, taxes, or
other sums of money in which the people of this state
are interested, and which such officer is by law empowered to collect, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

76-8-414.

1973

76-8-407. Refusing to give tax assessment information, or giving false information.
Every person who unlawfully refuses, upon demand, to give to any county assessor or deputy county
assessor a list of his property subject to taxation, or to
swear to such list, or who gives a false name, or
fraudulently refuses to give his true name when
demanded by the assessor in the discharge of his
official duties, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1973

76-8-408.

Giving false tax receipt or failing to
give receipt.
Every person who uses or gives any receipt, except
t h a t prescribed by law, as evidence of the payment for
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Stealing, destroying or mutilating
public records by one not custodian.
Every person, not an officer such as is referred to in
the preceding section, who is guilty of any of the acts
specified in t h a t section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1973
R e c o r d i n g false or forged instruments.
Every person who knowingly procures or offers any
false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or
recorded in any public office, which instrument, if
genuine, might be filed or registered or recorded
under any law of this state or of the United States, is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
1973
76-8-415.

D a m a g i n g or r e m o v i n g m o n u m e n t s of
official surveys.
Every person who willfully injures, defaces, or removes any signal, monument, building, or appurtenance thereto, placed, erected, or used by persons
engaged in the United States or state survey is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor.
1973
76-8-416.

Taking toll or m a i n t a i n i n g road,
bridge, or ferry without authority —
Refusal to pay lawful tolL
Any person who demands or receives compensation
for the use of any bridge or ferry, or who sets up or
keeps any road, bridge, or ferry, or constructed ford,

